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COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 2
SUPREME COURT OF MICIGAN. 3
SUPREME COUIT OF PENNSYLVANIA.'
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
Regutarty .Presurned.-The regularity of an acknowledgment taken
before a reputable acknowledging officer is presumed, and the burden
of proof is with the party contesting an acknowledgment to show mis-
conduct on the part of the officer, or forgery or other irregularity which
he ought to have discovered: Holtrtiewnc v. Schnoor, S. 0. Mich.
ADMIRALTY.
6illison-Pilot.-rin cases of collision, where there is a great con-
flict of testimony, the court must be governed chiefly by undeniable and
leading iacts, if such exist in the case. The court so governed in this
case: Tie Great Republi.', 23 Wall.
A pilot, when ie is close to a vessel before him making movements
which are not intelligible to him, ought not, in a case which is in the
least critical, to be governed by his "impressions" of what the vessel is
going to do. He should make and exchange signals, and ascertain posi-
tively her purposed movements and mancouvres : .
A steamer close to the right bank of a broad river-one, ex. r., a
half a mile broad-which means to cross over and land on the left shore,
is not bound, in the first instance, to give three or more whistles, which
is the signal for landing It is enough that she give two whistles, which
is the signal that she is going to the left. The three or more whistles
may be given later: .1d.
Constructions not favorable put on the testimony and manoeuvres of
a pilot who, it was proved, was " addicted to drinking when ashore," and
who confessed to having been drinking on the day when his vessel left
port, and within an hour of which time a collision occurred ; though he
swore that lie had not taken any drink for six hours before his boat left
its dock : id.
Similar constructions put on the conduct of a captain whose watch it
was, but who, instead of baing engaged in a proper place in superintend-
ing the navigation of his vessel, was on the lower deck conversing with
a passenger: Id.
A large and fast-sailing steamer is bound to act cautiously when over-
taking and getting near to a small and slow one; and a collision having
occurred between two steamers of this sort, a miner fault of the small
and slow steamer was held not to make a case for division of damages
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 23 of his Reports.
2 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 42 Maryland Rep.
3 From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter, and Henry A. Chancy, Esq. Cases decided
at January Terni 1876. The volume in which they will be reported cannot yet be
indicated.
4 From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 78 Pa. State Reports.
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where such fault bore but a little proportion to many faults of the large
and fast one: Id.
When, in a case of collision, it appears that one of the vessels ne-
glected the usual and proper measures of precaution, the burden is on
her to show that the collision did not occur through her neglect: Id.
Negligene- Collision- Tig- boat for Assistance against lyre.-The
owners of a vessel in flames towed by a tug and no longer in command
of her own captain and crew, are not liable for injury done by her to
an6ther vessel, by the negligence of the captain of the tug; the said
owners not having employed the tug, she 'being a tug whose regular
business was the assistance of vessels in distress, and she having gone,
of her own motion, to the extinguishment of the fire in this case: The
Clarita and 1c clara, 23 Wall.
A vessel anchored in the Hudson, opposite to the Hoboken wharves,
if anchored three hundred and fifty yards front their river front, is an-
cliored so far from shore that in case of a collision with a vessel towed
in flaones out of the Hoboken docks, no allegation can be made that she
is anchored too near the shore: Id.
A vessel at anchor having an anchor-light and one man on deck,
though not strictly an anchor-watch, is guilty of no fault in not being
better lighted or watched : Id.
A vessel whose business it is to give relief to vessels on fire is bound
to have chain hawsers or chain attachments on board ; and if having
only manilla hawsers, she is compelled to tow a vessel out of its dock
with such a hawser, which is burnt, so that the vessel on fire gets loose
front the tug, and, drifting, sets fire to another vessel, the tug is liable
for the damages caused: Id.
The owners of a vessel who through their own carelessness (or that
of their captain) set fire to another vessel, cannot claim salvage for put-
ting that fire out: Id.
AGENT.
Proof qf Autlorit/-Res gestf.-In an action for goods sold, the
plaintiff testified that defendant said, "if he concluded to take them he
would have George come there and tell us so; give us the order."
This ws not proof that defendant had authorized George to act as his
agent to buy the goods, nor justified the admission of the evidence of
his statements: Grim. v. Bonnell, 78 Penna.
An agent may prove his authority when by parol, but his declarations
in pais are not proof of it : rd.
An agent's declarations may be evidence against his principal as part
of the res gest , if made in conducting his agency, after his agency has
established his authority to speak for his principal : Id.
George told plaintiff that defendant had concluded to take the goods,
and gave plaintiff a memorandum to ship the goods to defendant, to
whom George was indebted. Defendant testified that be had given no
order for the goods. Evidence that at the time of the delivery of the
goods to defendant lie said lie had bought them from George and gave
him credit on his books for the price, was admissible : Id.
Declarations to become part of the res gestm, must have been made at
the time of the act done: Id.
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ALLUVION.
TV/at is-Boundary.-Where a survey begins "on tie bank of a
river" and is carried thence I" to a point in the river," the river-bank
being straight and running according to this line, the tract surveyed is
bounded by the river. It is even more plainly so when it begins at a
post ," on the bank of the river, thence north five degrees east up the
river and binding therewith :" County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23
Wallace.
Alluvion means an addition to riparian land, gradually and imper-
ceptibly made, through causes either natural or artificial, by the water
to which the land is contiguous: Id.
The test of what is gradual and imperceptible is that, though the wit-
nesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they
could not perceive it while the process was going on: I.
It matters not whether the addition be to streams which do overflow
their banks or those that do not. In each case it is alluvioii: Id.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS. See Limitations.
BANKRUPTCY.
Consent of Debtor to Judgment.-A judgment-debtor having pur-
chased land before the lien had expired, agreed by amicable scirefucias
to revive the judgment so as to create a lien on the after-acquired land.
Within four ionths lie was declared bankrupt. Held, that the agree-
ment was not in fraud of the bankrupt law: Kemmerer v. Tool et al.,
78 Penna.
The circumstance that a debtor consents to do what was for his own
advantage would not affect the creditor with knowledge of insolvency,
which from other facts he had no reasonable cause to believe : Id.
The bankrupt's real estate was sold by the sheriff, who paid thejudg-
mwnt-creditor in the revived judgment. Hheld, that the Court of Com-
mon Piers had jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the assignees in bank-
ruptcy for the recovery of the money so paid, if the judgment had been
in fraud of the bankrupt 
lai : Id.
Attachment- Construction of Sections 14, 35 and 39 of the Bankrz)t
Act of 1867.-The failure of the defendant to appear and defend an
attachment against his property, is no evidence of his having done any
act to procure the attachment within the meaning of section 35 of the
Bankrupt Act of 1867, or to procure or suffer his property to be taken
under legl process within the meaning of section 39 of said act: Hen-
kelinza awml others v. Satith, Assignee, 42 Md.
Section 14 of the Bankrupt Act refers, and can only refer, to attach-
ments which are pending at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed,
and not to such as have been prosecuted to a judgment prior to thefiling
of such petition: -1d.
The attachment having been properly issued and prosecuted to judg-
ment, that judgment is final, imports absolute verity, is conclusive with
respect to the subject-matter adjudicated, and cannot be re-examined or
impeached in a collateral proceeding: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Forged Draft-Recoery from prior Endorser.-An Indiana bank
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drew on a Philadelphia bank in favor of the cashier of a New York
bank; the draft was stolen, the name of the cashier (payee) forged as
ciidurser'and passed to defendants, October 16th, in payment of goods
sold to the holder, they giving to him a check on the Philadelphia bank
for the difference, which was drawn, and the draft, endorsed by the de-
fendants, was deposited to their credit in the same bank. After learning
of the fraud, on November 2d the bank demanded payment of the draft
from defendants. Held, that the demand was in time: Chambers et al.
v. Union National Bank,- 78 Penna.
.Under Act of April 5th 1849, the amount of the draft could be reco-
vered back from the defendants: Id.
The holder of a draft which is endorsed and passed by him, guaran-
ties the prior endorsements: Id.
BOUNDARY. See Alluvion.
CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.
Factor not Owner.-Under the Abandoned and Captured Property
Act, which gives to "the owner" of any such property a right, after it
has been sold by the government, to recover the proceeds of it in the
Treasury of the United States, a factor who has merely made advances
on the property-there being another person who has the legal interest
in the proceeds-is not to be regarded as "the owner ;" at least not to
be so regarded beyond the extent of his lien: United States v. Villa-
longa 23 Wallace.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See Debtor and Creditor; Replevin.
COLLISION. See Admiralty.
CONFLICT or LAWS. See Husband and Wife; Intoxicating Liquors.
CONTRACT.
In Restraint of Trade-Equity-Damages.-A mother sold her place
of business and contracted that 1" she will not engage in the same busi-
ness, directly or indirectly," in the Twenty-second Ward. within ten
years, but would by her counsel promote the business of the purchaser ;
she bought a lot and put up buildings suitable for the business for her
son ; she advanced money to him for carrying on, as she bad done to
other children in their business. The masIter found that the business
was really that of the son and not that of the defendant, was carried on
by him on his own credit and means, and not by her. There was no
evidence of injury to the purchaser. Under a bill to restrain her from
aiding in the business, permitting the premises to be used for the busi-
ness, or selling the property to be used for the business: Held, under
the circumstances an injunction should not be decreed: Harkinson's
Appeal, 78 Penna.
Agreements in restraint of trade generally are void ; to be valid they
must be limited in time or partial in their operation and supported by a
sufficient consideration : Id.
That a court of equity may enjoin against the free exercise of a trade,
the violation of the agreement should not be doubtful : Td.
Certainty is an essential element in the contract whose enforcement
is sought by an injunction, and some appreciable damage should be
shown : Id.
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When damages will compensate the benefit derived or the loss suf-
fered, equity will not interfbre by injunction : ld.
CRIMINAL LAW.
.AMrder-.L vilecnce-Degree.-On a trial for murder it was competent
to give evidence, for the purpose of showing motive, that the prisoner
and the deceased both visited the same woman ; that just after the bomi-
cide the prisoner said he had warned deceased not to visit her, she would
prove a curse to any man, and now it had come to pass: McCue v.
Commonwealth, 78 Penna.
Unless the Commonwealth shows "ingredients" of murder in the
first degree, no presumption arises from the killing that the offence is
higher than murder in the second degree : R.
If the evidence shows that from which it may be reasonably concluded
that the murder was wilful, deliberate and premeditated, it is fbr the
jury to pronounce the degree, and the power of the Supreme Court,
under the Act of February 15th 1870, to determine whether ingredients
of murder in the first degree existed, 
ceases : Id.
If the killing was not accidental, malice and a design to kill are to be
presumed from the use of a deadly weapon, the law adopting the rational
belief that a man intends the usual, immediate and natural consequences
of his voluntary act : Id.
Where upon a conviction of murder in the first degree the record does
not show that before sentence the prisoner was asked if he had anything
to say why sentence should not be pronounced, it is error, and the .sen-
tence will be reversed and the record remitted, that he may be sentenced
afresh: Id.
DAMAGES. See Trover.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Equity.
Chattel Mortgage-Time of P,,/ment--Prernature Seizure b4y o,'t-
gagee.-A mortgagee of chattels who had expressly fixed a certain time
and place for the payment of the mortgage, the time being a few days
later than the date of the maturity of the debt, made himself a wrong-
doer by seizing the chattels on the day before the day he had fixed for
payment; payment on that day would have been a satisfaction of the
debt: Baxter v. Spencer, S. 0. Mich.
DEED. See Acknowledgment.
DivoRcE. - See Husband and Wife.
EQUITY: See Contract; Auuicizpal 0orporation.
,Debtor and Creditor-J.urisdiction in Egaziity-Parties-~fltifarous-
ness.-A creditor who has exhausted his remedy at law by a fruitless
execution on his judgment, has the right to ask the aid of a court of
equity to discover and reach the equitable assets of his debtor, includ-
ing property purchased by the debtor in the name of another, and to
have fraudulent conveyances standing in his way and covering up the
property set aside and vacated. Jurisdiction in equity to grant such
relief is clear, and established by abundant authority: Trego et al. v.
Slinner, 42 Md.
VOL. XXIV.-48
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In such a proceeding, where part of the property pursued has been
mortgaged, but no relief is sought against the mortgagee, whose mort-
gage is not assailcd, and whose title under it is conceded to be valid,
such mortgagee is not a necessary party to the proceeding : lid.
Where the object of the bill is to obtain satisfaction of the coni-
plainants' judgments out of the assets and property of their debtor,
which they allege he has fraudulently concealed and conveyed to dif-
ferent parties, the several persons to whom he has thus conveyed dis-
tinct parcels of his property, real and personal, for the same fraudulent
purpose, may be joined with the debtor in the bill, though such persons
may have no common interest in the several parcels so conveyed, and
no joint fraud in any one transaction be charged against all of them:
Id.
ESTOPPEL.
Repudiatioa of Cootract-Rleading.-One who has repudiated a
contract is estopped from afterward claiming the benefit of it for the
purpose of turning the other party out of court on the ground that the
latter should have sued him on the alleged contract, instead of under
the common counts : Xe Queen, v. Gamble, S. C. Mich.
EVIDENCE. See Agent.
Shop books-Testimony of Parties under Act of 1869.-Prior to the
Act of April 15th 1869 (Witnesses) books of original entry were the
evidence, the oath of the party was supplementary. Since, the party is
a competent witness and may prove his claim as a stranger would have
done befbre: Nichols et al. v. Haynes, 78 Penna.
Lumping charges in a book would not stand as evidence, but the testi-
mony of the party that the entry was composed of items known to him
to have been furnished would be competent to go to the jury: 1d.
The party's knowledge that the sum was correct would make it evi-
dence ; the credibility as to it would be for the jury : id.
GIFT.
Delive y must be according to Nature of ATticle-Rusband and lWfe.-
To perftect a gift, the delivery must be according to the nature of the
thing-an actual delivery, so far as the subject is capable of it, must be
the true and effectual way of obtaining the command and dominion of
the subject: Bond v. Bunting, 78 Penna.
If the thing be not capable of actual delivery, there must be some act
equivalent to it; the owner must part both with the. possession and do-
minion of the property: Id.
If the thing be a chose in action, an assignment or some equivalent
instrument must be actually executed : Id.
Wherever a party has power to do a thing, and means to do it, the
instrument lie employs shall be so construed as to give effect to his in-
tention : Id.
The provisions of the Married Woman's Act, April 11th 1848, are
confined to powers given to her husband to sell and dispose of her real
and personal property. A wife may assign her choses in action, her
husband joining, without acknowledgment of any kind: Id.
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GUARANTY.
Liability of Guara.ator-Pleadiin-General Denurrer-Sufficieney
of a Declaration.-The obligation of one signing and sealing a guaranty,
which it was intended should be signed by llim alone, is not impaired
by the fact that the guaranty concluded " in witness whereof wc have
hereunto set our hands and affixed our seal:" 1Mitchell v. JaCleary, 42
mi.
In an action by the lessor of certain premises against a guarantor on
his guaranty in writing that the lessee of said premises should pay the
rent and comply with all his obligations in the lease, the declaration
averred that "the defendant did on the day of the execution of said
lease and as part thereof, and prior to, and as a condition precedent to
the making of said lease and to the delivery of said property, guarantee
in writing unto the said plaintiff in manner and form as follows;" and
then followed the guaranty ipsissinis verbis. The declaration also re-
peatedly averred that the guaranty was a part and parcel of the consid-
eration for the lease; that the lease was made on the faith of it. and that
the premises were delivered, and the lessee took possession of them under
and subject to said lease and guaranty. On a general demurrer to the
declaration, it was heold: 1. That the declaration was sufficient; 2.
That the guaranty being absolute, and not a mere overture or offer to
guarantee, notice of its acceptance was not required to make the gua-
rantor liable thereon: Id.
THUS1AND AND WIFE. See Gift; Replevin.
hoses in Action-Liability of the Estate of a Husband for a Debt
contracted b.y hint in favor of his 1/e, as against the Claims of subse-
guent Oredltors.-A married woman being entitled to a distributive
share of the proceeds of the real estate of her father, sold under pro-
ceedings for a partition, sold her share with the consent of her husband,
and took the note of the purchaser for the purchase-money. This note
the husband collected as a loan by his wife to him upon an agreement
with her, to repay it to her with interest, and gave her his note for the
amount due her. Afterwards, the husband becoming embarrassed, in
order to protect his wife's claim paid two judgments against himself and
caused them to be entered to her use. The validity of this transaction
being impeached by subsequent creditors of the husband as in fraud of
them, it was Held, 1st, That the husband did not reduce the chose in
action of his wife into his possession by virtue of his marital rights, but
in pursuance of his agreement with his wife obtained control of the
note; and his agreement to repay her the amount he collected on it was
founded upon an adequate consideration; 2d, That the claim of the wife
was manifestly just and should be allowed : Drury v. Jlriscoe, 42 Md.
Marriage- Proof of- Declarations-Reputaton-Statte--xtra-
Territorial Efect.-Where an illicit connection has one existed, it is in-
cumbent upon those who set up subsequent marriage between the parties,
to show when and where it occurred; and having undertaken to prove
that a valid marriage was celebrated at a particular tinie and place, the
parties cannot be permitted, if the evidence should he insfflicient to
establish such marriage, to rely upon other fits and eirennstances as
the ground of presumption that a marriage may have taken 'lace between
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the parties at some other and different time and place from that testified
to by the witness ; the presumption in such case being that the con-
nection between the parties continued to be illicit, until that presumption
is overcome by distinct proof of marriage: Barnum v. Barnum et al.,
42 Md.
Marriage may be proved in civil cases, other than actions for seduc-
tion, by reputation, declarations and conduct of the parties ; but when
reputation is relied on, that reputation, to raise the presumption of
marriage, must be founded on general, not divided or singular opinion ;
and where reputation in such case is divided it amounts to no evidence
at all. And so with respect to the declaratiops of the parties; the value
of such declarations as evidence will always depend upon the circum-
stances under which they were made : Id.
The declarations of a mother as to the marriage of her son, are admis-
sible after her death, to show that one who claimed and was admitted
to be his son, was illegitimate : Id.
General repute in a family, proved by surviving members of it, is ad-
missible upon a question of marriage : Id.
Upon a question of legitimacy the declarations of a father that his
son was illegitimate are competent evidence : Id.
The act of a state legislature declaring that A. was thereby consti-
tuted a legal lLr of B. confers no capacity upon A. to acquire property
beyond the state passing the act: Id.
Divorce.-A decreeyro confesso cannot be made upon a libel in divorce.
If either party does not attend, the court must decide on testimony taken
exparte : Kilborn v. Field et vx., 78 Penna.
A contract between husband and wife, pending proceedings in divorce,
to pay her a sum of money, the consideration of which was, iu whole or
in part, that she would not oppose the divorce, is void: Id.
INSURANCE.
Life-poclly-Competion of Contract.-A., of San Francisco, aged
twenty-six, applied, on the 5th of June 1867, to the agent there of a
New York life insurance company to insure his life, the money to be
payable "at forty-five or death," and the policy to take effect froni the
date of the application. The agent acknowledged the receipt of S99.30
as the first quarterly premium, with a proviso that "said application
shall be accepted by the company; but should the same be declined or
rejected by said company, then the full amount paid by A. will be re-
turned to the applicant on the production of this receipt." In fact, A.
did not pay any money at this time, but only gave a promissory note for
the 599.30, which note he never, at any time, paid:
Upon the trial, the court below (to whieh the ease was submitted
without the intervention of a jury, under the Act of March 3d 1865,
which enacts that the court may, by agreement of parties, find the facts,
and that the finding shall have " the same effect as the finding of a
jury,") found, as a fact, that the company "accepted" the application
and sent a policy to its agent; "but that the policy did not in terms
agree with the memorandum as to date and time of payment." -The
policy sent made the quarterly payment $96.60 (a difference in A's
favor), and the policy was antedated so as to run from the 5th day of
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April 1867-a day which the policy showed was the applicant's birthday.
This variation was, of course, against his interest. Accompanying the
policy sent to the agent were two receipts for premiums, executed by
the company in New York, one as of the 5th of April 1867, and the
other as of the 5th of July 1867, under which receipt was a "Notice to
policy-holders," that unless premiums were paid ol or before the day
they became due, the policy was forfeited and void; that agents were
not authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts, or waive for-
feitures; that payments of lVremiums to agents were not valid unless
receipts were given, signed in New York by the officers of the company,
the local agents to countersign them as evidence of payment; and that
all premiums were payable in New York. The policy and these re-
ceipts reached the agent at San Francisco on the 2d of August, having
been executed in New York, probably twenty-three to thirty days
before. The agent countersigned them, and on the 8th (six days after
receiving it) wrote to A., then absent from home, infbrming him that
his policy had arrived, and asking whether he would have it sent to
him or held subject to his order. It did not appear whether A. re-
ceived or did not receive the letter. On the 21st of August he was
shot (becoming at once insensible), and died on the 20th of September.
Held, that owing to the change of terms in the policy from those con-
templated by A., the applicant, the acceptance by the company was a
qualified acceptance which A. was not bound to accept; that there
having been no evidence that he did accept it, the company was not
bound: Insurance Co. v. Young's Administrator, 23 Wall.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Contract by Foreign Trendor.-The agent of a foreign liquor-selling
establishment obtains an order which he sends to his employers for
approval. Held, that there is no completed contract until the order is
approved and accepted, and that if that is done outside of the state, it
is a foreign contract, and not void as in violation of the liquor law of
?dichigan: Kling v. Pries, S. C. Mich.
Illegality and bad faith are not to be presumed against a foreign con-
tract, but must be shown: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Constructive Eviction-Implied Obligation on the part of a Landlord.
-N. leased to G. certain property to be used as a distillery, at $125 a
month, payable monthly. As a preliminary to the use of the distillery,
it was necessary for the lessee to file with the United State collector the
written consent of the lessor as the owner in fee of the property, in
accordance with sect. 3262 of title xxxv of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, unlegs the commissioner authorized the collector to
accept the bond of the lessee in lieu of such written consent. The
lessor refused to give such written consent, and in consequence thereof
the lessee was prevented from running the distillery and the property
remained idle. In an action by the lessor to recover the rent of the
premises, it was Held, 1st. That the refusal of the lessor to give his
written consent to the lessee, as required by law, to enable him to carry
on the business for which the premises were leased, discharged the lessee
from all obligation to pay the rent-the default of the lessor in this par-
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ticular amounting to " constructive evietion," so far as the legitimate
employment of the property was concerned. 2d. That the obligation of
the lessor to give his consent, as required by the law, was to be implied
as a necessary incident to the lease, as fully as if there had been inserted
a positive stipulation to that effect: , Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md.
LEASE.
Joint Occupancy-Ulaim for Rent nob Assignable as between mere
Joint Occupiers.-Under an agreement for the mere joint occupancy of
premises and joint-conduct of business, there can be no claim for rent
aisignable by one of the parties as against the other. The remedy for
a breach of the contract would be an action for damages, and not one
for use and occupation : Carver v. Palmer, S. C. Mich.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Application of Payments.-Kiff gave Moore ten notes, one payable
each consecutive year without interest; judgment was entered on them
at the same time ten plain notes were given f~r the interest, payable yearly.
Kiff made payments to Moore from time to time ; neither party made
any appropriation of these payments to either debt. More than six
years after the interest-notes were due, in a scirefacias on the judgment,
the court charged, " as the interest-noles are now barred by the statute,
thes6 payments must be applied to the debt in controversy." .Held to
be error : igoore v. .Kiff et al., 78 Penna.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Evidence-Province of Court and Jury- When Court not reguired,
ex nero nwtu, to define Malice.-In an action for a malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff offered to prove that pursuant to the regular custom of the
detective police department, his name was entered upon the detective
police annals of the city of Baltimore, and open to the inspection and
use of the police force, as tending to show the publicity of the charge
made against him and the consequent injury to him. .Held, that this
was clearly not admissible evidence against the defendant, unless there
was some law requiring such a record to be kept, or unless the plaintiff
was prepared to show by proof that the defendant knew that the name
of the plaintiff would be so entered as the consequence of the charge of
theft brought against him : Garvey v. Watson, 42 Md.
A prayer which asks the court to instruct the jury that malice "in its
legal sense, is any wrongful act done intentionally without legal justifi-
cation or excuse," is erroneous: 1st. Because malice is not an act but
the wrongful motive that prompts the act. 2d. Because what constitutes
a legal justification or excuse is matter of law to be determined by the
court, and no prayer should be granted which submits such a question
to the jury: Id.
Where a prayer groups together various facts and asks the court to
instruct the jury that they may consider said facts, if found by them, in
determining whether or not the defendant was actuated by malice, and
several of the facts so enumerated, even if found by the jury, would not
be evidence of malice, such prayer should be rejected : Id.
In an action for a malicious prosecution upon a charge of theft, the
voluntary attendance of the defendant upon the execution of.the search-
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warrant and his entrance into the plaintiff's house while the search was
being made, is no evidence of malice on his part.: Id.
Where the court has rejected a prayer defining malice because it was
incorrect, it is not bound cx mero moto to give any definitioh of it: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Taking Second Mortgage for same Debt.-Where a mortgage was
given to a guardian to secure a debt due his wards, and subsequently a
new guardian was appointed in his place, who, in ignorance or the ex-
istence of subsequent encumbrances upon the property, agreed that the
time of payment of the mortgage-debt should be extended, and took a
new mortgage on the same property to secure its payment, but without
releasing the first mortgage, it was ileld, that the debt secured by the
two mortgages was the same and should havc the benefit of the lien of
the first mortgage : Driny et ux. v. Briscoe, 42 Md.
MIUNICI'AL CORPORATION.
Jurisdiction in. Equity- Tiolation, of Ordbinacc-.Yiisanice.-Courts
of chancery have no jurisdiction to restrain the threatened violation of
a municipal ordinance unless the act amounts to a nuisance : 1llage of
St. Johns v. MlcFarlan, S. C. Mlich.
The erection of a wooden building within municipal fire-limits is not
of itself a nuisance, nor does the fact that it is prohibited by an ordi-
nance make it so: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Admiralty.
Railroad Whistle- When, Negligence, is for the Court.-Negligence
is the absence of care, according to the circumstances: Plhiladelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad .Co. v. Stinger, 78 Penna.
It is the duty of an engineer approaching a highway, if danger is to
be apprehended, to give warning by sounding the whistle, or other suffi-
cient alarm ; the failure to do so is negligence per se, to be determined
by the court: Id.
The court is to decide the question of negligence, where the precise
duty is determinate and the same under all circumstances : Id.
A wanton, unnecessary sounding of the whistle is negligence : Id.
A railroad company having a chartered right to propel their cars by
steam, are not responsible for injuries resulting from the proper use of
such agency : Id.
Whether alarming a horse and causing an accident by a rapidly-mov-
ing train, or sounding a whistle, will make the company liable fo.r
damages, depends upon w-bether it was from want of proper care in those
in charge of the train : -d.
What would be due care in running a train through a sparsely settled
rural district might be negligence in approaching a large city : Id.
A train was passing through a city on a railroad which had a number
of short curves, so that persons could see the train but for a short dis-
tance ; it was crossed by several streets and passed over a river on 0
drawbridge; the rule of the company required that the whistle should
be sounded about a certain point, to warn the bridge-tender and persons
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about to cross at other streets. Held, the use of the whistle at that
point in the ordinary manner was not negligence : d.
If the whistle had not been sounded at such point and one had been
injured by reason of the ouission, it would have been negligence -er se:
Id.
One driving an unbroken or vicious horse, or one easily frightened
by a locomotive, along a public road running side by side with a rail-
road, does so at his own peril ; the right of the company to move their
trains on their road is as high as that of the individual to use the public
road : Id.




Prior Demand- Chattel M1ortgaye-Hitsband and Wife-Evidence.-
A husband gave a chattel mortgage upon a span of horses in use on
his wife's farm, and absconded. The morlgagee, without making any
demand for them, replevied them for breach of the condition of the
mortgage. Held, that the mere presence of the horses on the farm did
not make the wife a wrongdoer, and that the mortgagee was at least
bound to present his claim to her, to be recognised or rejected, before
he could lawfully subject her to the costs of a suit: Campbell v.
Quackenbush, S. C. Mich.
In replevin brought against a wife upon a liability incurred by her.
husband, who had absconded, testimony of what the husband had said
and done was inadmissible, unless the acts or statements had been in
her presence or with her knowledge: Id.
SUR.TY. See &rover.
TROvER.
Suretl-Effect of Recovery in Trover on Title to Goods-Joint Con-
verson-Damayes.-The relation of suretyship is based on the consent
of all the parties: Kenyon v. Woodruff, S. 0. Mich.
A recovery for conversion terminates the right to reclaim the pro-
perty converted : ld.
Where parties are jointly guilty of conversion, and judgment has
been recovered against one of them therefor, the injured party, by pro-
ceedng to enforce collection against him under that judgment, elects
to look to him alone and bars himself from having recourse to the rest:
Id.
A deputy sheriff was deceived by certain persons into converting
property for their benefit. Judgment was recovered against him for
the conversion, and he, in turn, sueing them in tort for the damage
caused him by their fraud, recovered the amount of the judgment ob-
tained against himself. This was held a proper measure of damage: Id.
